Low Expectations: Don’t Expect Major Breakthroughs Anytime Soon

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By : Lowell Hagan

tagesschau24 interview (published 21 October 2026, 20:54 CET) — Andreas Umland, senior researcher at the European Policy Institute in Kyiv, on the recent announcement that Moscow is prepared to return to talks with the United States and Ukraine.

Lede
Russia has signalled it will reopen negotiations from mid-November. But does that signal genuine willingness to compromise? Umland tells tagesschau24 he is sceptical: after years of episodic “negotiation theatre” since 2014, the Kremlin’s aims remain focused on extracting territorial and sovereignty concessions from Kyiv.

Why fresh talks may mean little

Umland stresses that the pattern is familiar. For more than a decade, purported peace talks have usually been about what Russia can get in exchange for a halt to fighting — territory, limits on Ukrainian sovereignty. “At the moment I don’t have much hope,” he says, describing the announcements as likely another round of political manoeuvring rather than the start of a serious settlement.

He does, however, leave room for a different dynamic if conditions inside Russia change. Increased pressure from Ukrainian long‑range strikes or a deepening economic crisis could strengthen factions in Moscow that favour a ceasefire. Only under such material strains would negotiations acquire genuine substance, Umland argues; until then, he expects more performance than progress.

Empty negotiation table with papers and microphones suggesting stalled talks
Diplomatic talks often staged without real concessions.

Why Kyiv’s freeze proposals probably won’t entice Moscow

President Volodymyr Zelensky recently told Fox News that Ukraine would be willing to freeze the front line. Umland points out that this is not new: Zelensky first floated such proposals around spring 2025 and has repeatedly suggested partial ceasefires — for example, halting long‑range strikes on energy infrastructure or stopping hostilities in the Black Sea.

Moscow, Umland says, has repeatedly rejected those offers because its price for a ceasefire has always been territorial gain. He invokes a classic observation about conquest: the attacker seeks peace only once the territory has been taken. “That is how it is with Putin now,” Umland says — the Kremlin wants to secure land as the cost of any cessation of hostilities.

The spectre of a renewed great‑power settlement

One of Umland’s deepest concerns is that the conflict could be settled, not by Ukrainians, but in a great‑power forum that sidelines smaller states. He warns of the risk of a new “Yalta” — a meeting of major powers where Eastern Europe’s fate is carved up without meaningful input from the affected countries.

“That is the big fear,” he says, and he believes that restoring a Yalta‑style system appears to be a Russian objective: a return to a world where great powers decide the borders and political status of smaller neighbours behind closed doors.

Grand empty conference hall evoking great‑power negotiations
The risk of great‑power deals sidelining affected countries.

Signals to Washington: diplomatic gestures and political timing

Recent items in the headlines — the release of American detainee Stephen Hubbard and reports of diesel shipments from Russia to the United States — have prompted questions about a thaw in U.S.–Russia relations. Umland characterises these moves primarily as political signalling tied to the U.S. election cycle rather than as the start of a durable rapprochement.

Hubbard’s case, he notes, is striking because the 72‑year‑old American teacher had spent a long time imprisoned in Russian custody. The diesel deliveries, meanwhile, are both small in volume and designed to chip at the sanctions regime; in practical terms they are too limited to affect U.S. fuel prices. Taken together, Umland sees these acts as Moscow attempting to offer positive signals to benefit former President Trump’s campaign — “a kind of Russian support for the Republican campaign.”

Europe’s leverage and self‑interest

How much can European governments still influence the course of the war? Umland underlines that Europe’s aggregate power is significant and that the pro‑Ukraine coalition extends beyond Europe to partners such as Japan, Australia and Canada. “There is a coalition even without the United States,” he says.

But the critical question, he adds, is whether European states perceive a direct self‑interest in preventing further Ukrainian territorial losses and in upholding a ceasefire along the current front line. That self‑interest could be defined in concrete terms: stopping a new mass flow of refugees into Europe or preventing a scenario in which a partial Russian victory allows Moscow to redeploy forces against NATO member states — for instance, the Baltic countries — which would trigger collective defence obligations.

If European governments truly want to avoid millions more refugees or the escalation of the war into NATO territory, Umland argues, there should be enough national interest to maintain support for Ukraine at least to hold the present line.

What the likely U.S. midterms outcome could change

With the U.S. midterm elections imminent, many expect the Democrats to regain at least one chamber of Congress. Umland says this could matter: historically, Democrats have been more inclined to back Ukraine than the current Republican White House, which he describes as taking positions lately that are closer to Russia’s in some international votes and which has cut material support for Kyiv.

A Democratic gain in Congress might therefore shift overall U.S. policy toward the Ukraine in a more supportive direction. At the same time, Umland warns that changes in American domestic politics could also distract from foreign affairs, reducing U.S. public attention to international crises — a development that would not serve Ukraine well.

Additional context on recent gestures
– Stephen Hubbard: Umland calls the teacher’s long detention in Russia a scandal; his release is politically charged but does not by itself indicate a broad change in relations.
– Diesel exports: Moscow seeks to erode parts of the sanctions framework, but the scale of shipments announced is too small to produce a material effect in the U.S. market.

Interview notes
The conversation was conducted by Bernd Rasem for tagesschau24. The transcript has been edited for publication.

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